Saving Seafood

Applicants Sought to Conduct Phase II of the Pilot Regional Industry-Based Bottom Trawl Survey

October 7, 2026 — The following was released by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council:

The Northeast Trawl Advisory Panel (NTAP), NOAA Fisheries’ Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC), and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) seek applicants to execute Phase II of the pilot Regional Industry-Based Bottom Trawl Survey (RIBTS). ASMFC will issue a funding contract to support conduct of the survey. The anticipated timeframe to conduct the Phase II Survey is fall 2027.

Standardized surveys of marine fisheries species are crucial for conducting stock assessments that inform fishery management and for tracking ecosystem changes over time. Motivated by the critical need to find viable contingency options for the NEFSC bottom trawl survey (BTS), NEFSC is collaborating with NTAP to develop RIBTS. The long-term goal of the RIBTS program is to reduce uncertainty and increase accuracy in resource assessments with an annual collaborative fishing industry-based regional trawl survey. RIBTS is being developed with a phased approach.

Phase I, conducted by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) and the F/V Darana R, successfully evaluated day/night operational feasibility inside and outside of an offshore wind energy development area, established minimum vessel and scientific staff requirements, evaluated trawl performance across depth range, defined sampling limitations within offshore wind development infrastructure, and documented time-on-station requirements for catch, biological, and oceanographic sampling.

The goal of Phase II is to inform development of a full-scale survey, with focus on operational feasibility on multiple vessels and across a wider geographic area, including offshore wind areas, and the creation of reproducible methods and tools for a long-term RIBTS.

Proposals must be submitted as an electronic proposal by email no later than 11:59 PM on December 4, 2026, to Jainita Patel. Please see the Request for Proposals for more details, qualifying requirements, and submission instructions.

 For more information, please contact Anna Mercer.             

US Supreme Court won’t hear challenge to lobster GPS monitoring case

October 6, 2026 — The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear a case that argued against 24/7 GPS monitoring of the Maine’s lobster fishing fleet.

In 2023, Maine began requiring commercial lobstermen in the state to install GPS monitoring devices that would enable 24/7 tracking of the vessels – a move called for by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission. Soon after, lobstermen sued, calling it a violation of both the fourth and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

Read the full article at SeafoodSource

Menhaden debate puts fishermen under pressure

October 6, 2026 — As the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) prepares for a November vote on possible new Chesapeake Bay menhaden restrictions, fishermen and workers on both sides of the debate say the outcome could hit their livelihoods.

The Bay Journal reported Oct. 2 that bait fishermen in Maryland and Virginia are facing declining menhaden catches and rising costs, while employees of Ocean Harvesters and Omega Protein worry additional restrictions on the reduction fishery could mean smaller paychecks or eventually fewer jobs.

ASMFC is considering changes under Draft Addendum II that could cut the Chesapeake Bay menhaden harvest cap by as much as 50 percent and establish quota periods intended to spread harvest throughout the season. The commission is scheduled to vote at the Nov. 10-11 meeting, with public comment open through Oct. 9.

The debate comes as fishermen on both sides describe growing economic pressure.

According to the Bay Journal, Maryland bait fishermen harvested about 1 million pounds of menhaden in 2024, compared with as much as 10 million pounds in previous years. Robbie Wilson, a fourth-generation pound0net fisherman on Tilghman Island, Maryland, said rising diesel costs and weaker seafood demand could make this his last year targeting menhaden.

Read the full article at National Fisherman

Whit Fosburgh Misstates Menhaden Science on Qualified Captain Podcast and Overlooks American Fishing Families

October 6, 2026 – The following was released by the American Small Pelagics Network:

The Qualified Captain is a North Carolina-based boating and maritime interview podcast hosted by Aaron Stasiak. On the podcast, Stasiak interviews captains, marine industry participants and people who have survived incidents at sea, discussing their experiences and lessons for others on the water.

In episode 55, published on Oct 1, 2026, Stasiak interviewed Whit Fosburgh, executive director of the Forage Fish Campaign and former president and CEO of the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership. Their conversation addressed menhaden and other forage fish, industrial reduction fishing and proposals to restrict or end that fishing. Fosburgh made statements about menhaden science, fisheries management and the American businesses and workers the fishery supports that conflict with the documented record. The following twelve factual corrections present the corrected facts and supporting evidence.

 

1. Striped bass recovery

Fosburgh said the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (the ASMFC) concluded that reducing the menhaden quota from about 233,000 to 108,000 tons, a cut of almost 60%, would give striped bass only a 50–50 chance of recovery.

Facts: The assessment does not say that. The probabilities in the stock projections concern exceeding a menhaden ecological fishing mortality target. They are not probabilities of rebuilding striped bass. The ASMFC has explainedthat eliminating all menhaden fishing would not, by itself, rebuild striped bass to their biomass target. Sustainable striped bass management is also necessary.

 

2. Menhaden age assumptions

Fosburgh said scientists know menhaden can live to 11 years but assumed they would never live beyond about 4½ years and therefore concluded that “they will die anyway,” so the fishery could “catch just as much.”

Facts: There is no evidence that Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission scientists made that assumption or used that rationale. The assessment does not impose a maximum lifespan of 4½ years. It applies age-specific natural mortality rates, a measure of deaths from causes other than fishing, and separately models menhaden at ages zero through five and in an age-six-and-older group. NOAA Fisheries has collected menhaden age data for decades, and NOAA-published research has documented fish older than 4½ years.

Fosburgh’s statement inaccurately portrays both the assessment and the work of the ASMFC scientists. Natural mortality estimates can affect modeled biomass, fishing mortality and reference points, but that does not mean scientists assumed that older fish do not exist or concluded that catching them does not matter because they would “die anyway.” By attributing that rationale to scientists without evidence, Fosburgh makes an inaccurate disparagement of the scientific work underlying the assessment.

 

3. Products and American economic benefits

Fosburgh said menhaden are processed and shipped to Canada, North Africa or Southeast Asia for aquaculture, and that almost all the material goes abroad.

Facts: The product sales claim conflicts with Omega Protein’s reported figures. According to the company, 70% of its 2025 sales were to U.S. customers, 83% were within the United States, Canada and Mexico, and only 17% were overseas. Omega Protein also reports that none of its Atlantic menhaden products supply Cooke Seafood operations in Canada. The fishery’s American benefits include wages and healthcare for the workers, as documented by UFCW Local 400.

 

4. Osprey nest outcomes

Fosburgh said 90% of osprey nests fail in the Chesapeake Bay and along the New Jersey and Connecticut coasts because the birds have nothing to eat.

Facts: Local findings do not establish that approximately 90% of nests throughout the Chesapeake Bay fail because industrial fishermen have removed their food. The 2026 Chesapeake study found successful reproduction at 33.1% of high-salinity nests and 65.5% of low-salinity nests. Results at individual locations varied substantially. The study does not demonstrate that industrial harvest caused the observed reproductive deficits, and its Chesapeake findings cannot substantiate the same blanket claim for New Jersey and Connecticut given that no reduction menhaden fishing occurs in those estuarine waters.

 

5. Official stock status and ecosystem management

Fosburgh described the official finding of no overfishing as a defense advanced by paid industry representatives, then said the issue is protecting the ecosystem and that managers acknowledge they are not doing that.

Facts: NOAA’s finding that Atlantic menhaden are not overfished and are not undergoing overfishing is an official scientific conclusion. Menhaden management uses ecological reference points accounting for predator needs. Characterizing the finding as merely an industry defense, or suggesting that the management framework omits the ecosystem, misrepresents the assessment and is disrespectful of the expertise of the ASMFC scientists who conduct the scientific assessments. It is a well-known fact that menhaden stocks in both the Atlantic and Gulf are not overfished, overfishing is not occurring, and the species are certified sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council. Given Mr. Fosburgh’s long-time work in this subject matter he certainly must be aware that menhaden stocks on both coasts are healthy and sustainable harvested.

 

6. Natural mortality and assessment revisions

Fosburgh said managers increased the quota after changing scientific assumptions, refused to reconsider the research when warned, and later admitted a mistake. He said the natural mortality assumption was shifted so harvest could increase.

Facts: The assessment record documents a correction and scientific review. The ASMFC’s FAQ describes a tagging data correction and peer-reviewed reanalysis that lowered estimated natural mortality. The resulting revision lowered biomass estimates across the historical series; it did not demonstrate a sudden equivalent population decline. The ASMFC states that the 2025 update indicates total biomass actually increased slightly since 2021. The documented correction does not establish that the assumptions were changed to benefit industry.

 

7. Predator losses attributed to menhaden harvest

Fosburgh said science shows current coastwide menhaden harvest reduces striped bass by about 30%. He also attributes reductions of about 15% for Gulf king and Spanish mackerel and about 10% for red drum to the removal of their bait.

Facts: Fosburgh is restating a 30% allegation that the sportfishing lobby has repeatedly advanced through use of an altered graph from a 2017 study. This is not what the study shows. The allegation is a gross oversimplification of one forward-looking simulation, and the study’s lead author criticized that use. Since 2017, regulators have switched to ecosystem-based management of the menhaden fishery, reduced the Chesapeake Bay quota by 41% and reduced the coastwide quota by 10%. The study compared long-term simulated striped bass biomass and fishery yield under hypothetical menhaden fishing mortality rates with a zero-menhaden-fishing baseline; it did not measure a 30% decline in the striped bass population caused by the reduction fishery. The paper also said strong broad-scale evidence tightly coupling menhaden and striped bass population dynamics was lacking. The ASMFC now says that even ending all menhaden fishing would not, by itself, rebuild striped bass to its biomass target; sustainable recreational and commercial fishing on striped bass remains necessary.

Fosburgh’s 15% figures for Gulf king and Spanish mackerel and 10% figure for red drum do not follow from the available feeding evidence, which does not show that these predators depend on menhaden alone. NOAA reports that king mackerel eat fish, squid and shrimp, while Spanish mackerel feed on herring, menhaden, sardines, mullet, needlefish, anchovies, shrimp, crabs and squid. A 2024 peer-reviewed University of Southern Mississippi analysis integrating stomach content and stable isotope data for 41 predators and 173 prey categories found that northern Gulf predators are generalists and identified no single menhaden-dependent predator. Red drum had 46 observed prey types; the study estimated Gulf menhaden at 2.2% of its diet and the broader Brevoortia category at 2.1%.

Nor are Fosburgh’s Gulf percentages measured population losses. They are conditional outputs from a Gulf ecosystem model, not observations that current menhaden harvest reduced those predator populations by the stated amounts. Independent technical reviews by Emeritus Professor Doug Butterworth, director of the Marine Resource Assessment and Management Group at the University of Cape Town; Professor Ray Hilborn of the University of Washington’s School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences; and Professor Steven Cadrin of the Department of Fisheries Oceanography at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth’s School for Marine Science & Technology found too many technical problems to justify the model’s management conclusion, including uncertain diet inputs, inadequate fits to observed data and performance below conventional stock-assessment standards. The evidence may support examining possible food web tradeoffs, but it does not establish that menhaden harvest caused the 15% and 10% population reductions Fosburgh stated.

 

8. Claims that menhaden are absent

 

Fosburgh said menhaden are no longer seen along the entire coast. Later, he described people asking him about there being no striped bass and no menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay.

Facts: The claim that menhaden are no longer seen along the entire East Coast is contradicted by official fishery data and observations from several regions. The ASMFC reports that 2024 commercial landings, including reduction, bait, bycatch and episodic-event landings, totaled 186,155 metric tons, while bait and recreational landings alone totaled 52,200 metric tons. It also states that adult and juvenile menhaden form large, near-surface schools from Nova Scotia to northern Florida.  Maryland DNR found juvenile menhaden widespread in the Chesapeake Bay for the third consecutive year in 2025. Recent reporting likewise documented nearshore menhaden aggregations off New York feeding humpback whales. Large die-offs further confirm the species’ presence in areas Fosburgh described as empty. Maryland’s official 2025 fish-kill report recorded three Baltimore Harbor events totaling about 206,000 fish; two were almost exclusively Atlantic menhaden and about 99% of the third were menhaden. In March 2026, hundreds to thousands of menhaden washed ashore from Cape Henry to Nags Head following a cold-stun event; a Virginia fisheries spokesman said menhaden have a “huge population” offshore and that there are “so many menhaden out on the East Coast” that they were the most visibly affected species. In September 2026, Public Radio East reported a massive Neuse River kill consisting mostly of juvenile menhaden. Catch data, observed schools and repeated die-offs directly contradict an assertion that menhaden are absent from the coast or Chesapeake Bay.

 

9. Ownership and regulatory review
 

Fosburgh said Cooke bought Omega Protein and then established Ocean Harvesters to break rules prohibiting foreign companies from fishing in American waters.

Facts: Fosburgh is repeating accusations that were at the core of the failed False Claims Act lawsuit brought by W. Benson Chiles and Chris Manthey against Ocean Harvesters, Cooke Inc., Omega Protein and related defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that dismissal in August 2026. Reporting on MARAD’s separate review states that the agency found the company’s documentation satisfactory and compliant with fishery-endorsement requirements.

 

10. The effect of the quota reduction

Fosburgh said the reduced quota of about 186,000 tons was the same as the industry’s previous catch, so not a single fish was saved. He later calls it a paper reduction.

Facts: That conclusion confuses a harvest ceiling with realized landings. The ASMFC reduced the allowable catch from 233,550 to 186,840 metric tons. The reduction limits subsequent permitted harvest. Comparing the new ceiling with an earlier year’s actual landings does not establish that the reduction saves no fish.

 

11. Gulf bycatch numbers

 

Fosburgh said Louisiana’s research found about 150 million non-target fish are caught and killed every year. He said the percentage is small but the practical number is significant.

Facts: Fosburgh turned one season’s sample-expanded estimate into a recurring annual death count. The LGL study observed 3.2% of Louisiana menhaden-fishery effort in 2024 and expanded those samples to estimate total bycatch for that season; it did not establish that the same number is killed every year. The study estimated total bycatch at about 3.6% by weight, and its accounting distinguishes retained bycatch, released bycatch and estimated post-release mortality. LDWF’s official comparison shows where red drum and spotted seatrout fishery removals actually came from over 2015–2024, measured by weight. For red drum, recreational harvest accounted for 78.9% of total removals and recreational dead discards another 11.2%—90.1% combined—while dead menhaden fishery bycatch accounted for 9.9%. For spotted seatrout, recreational harvest accounted for 93.3%, recreational dead discards 3.9%, and commercial harvest 0.1%—97.3% from directed fisheries—while dead menhaden fishery bycatch accounted for 2.7%. A raw count of small individuals, detached from weight, species composition, disposition and comparison with directed fisheries, does not support Fosburgh’s characterization.

 

12. Employment and economic losses

Fosburgh said the Virginia plant employs 260 people in good jobs, but thousands of jobs are being lost in the bait, recreational fishing, small commercial fishing and whale-watching sectors because of the fishery.

Facts: Fosburgh offered no economic analysis establishing that the menhaden fishery is responsible for job loss in the thousands. He compared the direct headcount at one processing plant with an undefined claim spanning bait, recreational fishing, small commercial fishing and whale watching, expressed no concern for the minority and union jobs sustained by the menhaden fishery, and relied on measures that are not comparable and do not support attributing thousands of job losses to it.

The menhaden fishery itself has a substantial, documented economic footprint. The ASMFC’s Committee on Economics and Social Sciences reviewed the fishery’s broader footprint and cited historical modeling of approximately 519 full- and part-time reduction-sector jobs in Maryland and Virginia, including 347 in Northumberland County. The committee also warned that high fixed costs and minimum operating volume can make job losses nonlinear: crossing the break-even threshold could cause structural unemployment and potentially a complete plant shutdown, not a proportional reduction in a 260-worker headcount.

UFCW Local 400’s account and accompanying workforce video describe hundreds of union jobs, an overwhelmingly local workforce, one of Northumberland County’s largest minority workforces, and benefits that support healthcare, college and local businesses. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference separately warned that additional restrictions could disproportionately affect African American workers, union families and rural communities, and urged full recognition of affected workers and families. Together, this record documents substantial employment tied to the fishery and its economic importance to Northumberland County and surrounding rural communities.

About the American Small Pelagics Network
The American Small Pelagics Network represents fishermen, processors, suppliers, and coastal communities connected to fisheries such as menhaden, mackerel, herring, squid, and butterfish. ASPN supports sustainable fisheries management that supports critical fish species, while maintaining economic opportunities for fishermen and fishing communities.

Menhaden fishery workers caught in the middle of debate

October 5, 2026 — Carolmane Diggs was seasick the first week he was on an Ocean Harvester vessel in 2011. It was his first time on a boat, ever. But his dad, with decades of experience fishing for menhaden, was there to help him. Diggs had explored college and the military but ultimately decided to be a fisherman “to make my dad proud.”

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) will vote in November on whether to cut the company’s allowable menhaden catch in the Chesapeake Bay. Bait watermen believe the cut will mean more menhaden in their pound nets, while Diggs and other employees of Ocean Harvesters and its partner, Omega Protein, worry they’ll lose pay or even their jobs. Public comment on the cut is open until Oct. 9.

The ASMFC has deemed the menhaden population to be not overfished along the East Coast. The population’s biomass, or weight, has increased and remained stable since the 1990s. But the commission cut the company’s coast-wide harvest by 20% last October after concluding it had previously overestimated the species’ abundance.

The ASMFC will hold a vote at its meeting on Nov. 10-11 on whether to cut the company’s harvest up to 50% in the Bay and add quota periods that would evenly distribute the catch over time.

Commercial fishermen say that harassment from some Bay harvest opponents has become expected but rare. Mostly, other boats break up schools of menhaden before the industrial vessel can catch them. The fishermen say, though, the incidents have become more personal in recent years.

David Haynie, bosun with Ocean Harvesters, was aboard a harvesting boat when a jet skier yelled obscenities and drove over a net in 2023.

“The harassment is nerve wracking because you don’t know when a certain individual could just be on his worst day and get mad at us and do something very irrational and harm us,” Haynie said.

According to a report by the ASMFC’s Committee on Economics and Social Sciences, there will be a “break-even threshold” where, if the harvest limit is pushed too low for the company, it will have to shut down instead of instituting layoffs. It’s unclear where that point lies.

It’s also unclear if any layoffs would take place following the proposed cut. If the company catches less fish, employees would be paid less. Ocean Harvester fishermen are paid based on the number of fish caught. Diggs expects to lose $10,000 over the season due to the most recent cut.

The fishery employs about 510 people directly and indirectly. Because menhaden fishing is seasonal, many employees have side jobs, from cutting trees to catering to oystering. If layoffs were to happen, many said they would retire early or need to commute two hours away to find something with the same pay and benefits.

Read the full story at the Bay Journal

Washington Examiner Op-ed Gets the Facts Wrong on Menhaden, American Jobs and Fisheries Management

October 1, 2026 — The following was released by the American Small Pelagics Network:

A September 22 Washington Examiner op-ed by Forage Fish Campaign Executive Director Whit Fosburgh continues to perpetuate the campaign’s false narrative. Fosburgh ignores the science governing the fisheries, generations of American working-waterfront history, and the U.S. fishermen and workers whose livelihoods depend on them.

The op-ed portrays Louisiana and Mississippi as Gulf outliers because they permit menhaden purse seine fishing, while not mentioning their history of successful menhaden management. The most recent Gulf menhaden stock assessment found the stock is not overfished and overfishing is not occurring. Louisiana regulates the fishery through coastal buffers, bycatch limits, reporting requirements and other operating rules and commissioned a 2024 season-long scientific study of purse seine bycatch. That study found total bycatch to be about what fisheries managers had expected and was followed by voluntary fleetwide gear changes intended to further reduce red drum mortality.

Like its Atlantic counterparts, Louisiana’s menhaden fishery also supports American fishermen, processing workers, shipyards, mechanics, welders, truck drivers and suppliers across the coast. The fact that Louisiana and Mississippi permit purse seine fishing is not evidence that the fishery is unsustainable, poorly regulated or contrary to American economic interests. The insinuation that Louisiana and Mississippi are acting irresponsibly unfairly discounts the science-based work of their fisheries professionals and is insulting to Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry and Wildlife and Fisheries Secretary Tyler Bosworth, as well as Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves and Department of Marine Resources Executive Director Joe Spraggins.

On the Atlantic Coast, menhaden are managed as both a harvested species and prey. The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) uses ecological reference points designed to account for predator needs while allowing for a sustainable harvest. When the ASMFC adopted that system in 2020, Fosburgh himself called it a “landmark decision” and “a new era in fisheries management.”

The 2025 Atlantic menhaden assessment found the stock is not overfished and overfishing is not occurring. Revised natural mortality assumptions lowered historical stock estimates compared with prior assessments, but the assessment shows that biomass increased in recent years and the update did not show that managers had allowed years of excessive harvest. The ASMFC reported that the adopted 2026 catch level had a modeled zero-percent probability of exceeding the ecological overfishing threshold.

Fosburgh’s argument about the predator-prey relationship goes beyond the evidence. The ASMFC modeling shows that even eliminating all menhaden fishing would not, by itself, rebuild striped bass to their biomass target. In 2022–2023, recreational harvest and recreational release mortality accounted for 89 percent of striped bass removals. And an April 2025 ASMFC review of eight datasets covering 298,232 striped bass found that Fulton’s Condition Factor (a measure of fish body condition) remained above the 0.8 stress threshold and concluded the fish “are not starving and would be considered healthy.” This is an important distinction because individual striped bass can be in healthy body condition even while the stock remains below its biomass target. While striped bass feed opportunistically, eating many species in addition to menhaden, the evidence is consistent with the determination that the ecological reference points are leaving sufficient menhaden in the water for predators.

Recent Chesapeake Bay osprey research documents reproductive problems and food stress but does not establish commercial menhaden harvest as the cause. Lead author Dr. Bryan Watts has said his paper did not attempt to link poor osprey reproduction to menhaden harvest. The U.S. Geological Survey has also reported osprey reproductive problems elsewhere along the East Coast and in the Pacific Northwest.

The claim that menhaden are simply “worth more in the water” than when harvested is not an established economic fact. That argument was popularized by the 2012 Lenfest-funded Little Fish, Big Impact report, which relied on global ecosystem modeling rather than an economic valuation of Atlantic or Gulf menhaden, the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem or striped bass fishing. Subsequent peer-reviewed research challenged applying that conclusion as a general rule because predator responses to forage abundance vary by species, ecosystem conditions and spatial relationships.

Menhaden harvested within science-based limits create value through fishing, processing, wages, suppliers, aquaculture, animal and human nutrition, fish-oil products, and providing bait to recreational anglers and commercial fisheries. Recreational anglers may benefit from game fish feeding around concentrated menhaden schools, but that does not establish that every unharvested menhaden creates more economic value for Americans than a harvested one.

The op-ed’s Canadian-ownership argument is equally inaccurate. Omega Protein’s parent company, Cooke Seafood, is headquartered in Canada, but Atlantic menhaden vessels are operated by Ocean Harvesters, a U.S. company employing American union fishermen represented by UFCW Local 400. The Reedville, Virginia menhaden industry dates to the 1870s and has supported generations of Northern Neck families. His continued use of this framing is especially difficult to reconcile with the fact that he worked directly with these companies on these issues from 2015 to 2020 during the development of ecological reference points and has longstanding familiarity with the fishery, its management, and the companies involved. It is further evidence that Fosburgh and the Forage Fish Campaign are willing to present a misleading account in pursuit of their advocacy objectives.

Today the fishery provides family-supporting union jobs in a rural region where comparable employment can be difficult to replace. The operation employs one of the largest minority workforces in Northumberland County, and a 2023 collective bargaining agreement increased base pay, incentive rates and performance bonuses. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference has also warned that proposed restrictions could disproportionately affect African American workers, union families and rural communities, citing labor, wages, race, rural economic opportunity and the dignity of work.

The claim that most of the fishery’s economic value leaves the country is also inconsistent with available sales information. It falsely recasts menhaden management as a story about Canada taking an American resource. For marine ingredients, Omega Protein reports that 70 percent of its 2025 sales went to U.S. customers, 83 percent remained within the United States, Canada and Mexico, and only 17 percent went overseas. The company also reports that no products made from Atlantic menhaden are supplied to Cooke operations. Of the menhaden harvested for bait, 85 percent is sold to domestic U.S. recreational and commercial customers, while just 15 percent goes to Canadian customers, primarily lobster harvesters. The sales data directly contradict this scare-tactic framing.

It is a false economic comparison to compare roughly 250 direct jobs at one Reedville processing facility with the entire economic footprint of recreational striped bass fishing. Fosburgh’s 250-job figure also does not comport with the employment figures cited by ASMFC economists reviewing the reduction sector, who referenced earlier estimates of approximately 519 full- and part-time jobs in Maryland and Virginia, including 347 in Northumberland County alone. Those economists also warned that plant economics can create a shutdown threshold at which employment losses become much larger than a simple proportional reduction.

Finally, the assertion that reduction fishing was “pushed out” of every Atlantic state except Virginia rewrites the industry’s history. The historical record documented by the ASMFC shows a decades-long consolidation of the Atlantic reduction industry shaped at different times by changes in menhaden distribution and abundance, plant consolidation, operating capacity, environmental requirements and individual plant closures. By the early 1970s, the remaining Chesapeake reduction plants were already located in Reedville; by 2006, Reedville was the sole Atlantic reduction processing location. Some states later restricted or prohibited purse seining, but those policies do not explain a consolidation already well underway before the later restrictions. The history of plant consolidation on both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts does not support the narrative that consolidation resulted from states rejecting an unsustainable menhaden fishery. Reedville, Virginia; Moss Point, Mississippi; and Abbeville and Empire, Louisiana, have all been longstanding centers of the menhaden industry, with processing infrastructure, skilled workforces and fishing expertise around which the industry developed and consolidated.

A struggling predator does not by itself prove a menhaden harvest problem. Canadian ownership of a processor does not make American fishermen Canadian. Industry consolidation does not prove states rejected an unsustainable fishery. And self-serving recreational advocacy to displace sustainable commercial fisheries is not an economic analysis.

At least one part of the Forage Fish Campaign’s presentation is accurate: it is a campaign, not an independent research effort or a neutral accounting of the facts. Its arguments repeatedly rely on selective framing and misleading characterizations to influence its audience rather than presenting the full record in context.

Atlantic and Gulf menhaden should continue to be managed through stock assessments, applicable state and interstate rules, targeted research and transparent economic analysis—not by false advocacy narratives that omit the management record, the science and the American workers tied to these fisheries.

About the American Small Pelagics Network

The American Small Pelagics Network represents fishermen, processors, suppliers, and coastal communities connected to fisheries such as menhaden, mackerel, herring, squid, and butterfish. ASPN advocates for sustainable fisheries management that supports critical fish species, while maintaining economic opportunities for fishermen and fishing communities.

Applicants Sought to Conduct Phase II of the Pilot Regional Industry-Based Bottom Trawl Survey Proposals Due December 4, 2026

October 1, 2026 — The following was released by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission:

The Northeast Trawl Advisory Panel (NTAP), NOAA Fisheries’ Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC), and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) seek applicants to execute Phase II of the pilot Regional Industry-Based Bottom Trawl Survey (RIBTS). ASMFC will issue a funding contract to support conduct of the survey. The anticipated timeframe to conduct the Phase II Survey is fall 2027.

 
Standardized surveys of marine fisheries species are crucial for conducting stock assessments that inform fishery management and for tracking ecosystem changes over time. Motivated by the critical need to find viable contingency options for the NEFSC bottom trawl survey (BTS), NEFSC is collaborating with NTAP to develop RIBTS. The long-term goal of the RIBTS program is to reduce uncertainty and increase accuracy in resource assessments with an annual collaborative fishing industry-based regional trawl survey. RIBTS is being developed with a phased approach.
 
Phase I, conducted by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) and the F/V Darana R, successfully evaluated day/night operational feasibility inside and outside of an offshore wind energy development area, established minimum vessel and scientific staff requirements, evaluated trawl performance across depth range, defined sampling limitations within offshore wind development infrastructure, and documented time-on-station requirements for catch, biological, and oceanographic sampling. 
 
The goal of Phase II is to inform development of a full-scale survey, with focus on operational feasibility on multiple vessels and across a wider geographic area, including offshore wind areas, and the creation of reproducible methods and tools for a long-term RIBTS.
 
Proposals must be submitted as an electronic proposal by email no later than 11:59 PM on December 4, 2026, to Jainita Patel. Please download the RFP for more details, qualifying requirements, and submission
 
For more information, please contact Anna Mercer.

Washington Post Osprey Story Blurs the Line Between Science and Special Interests

September 30, 2026 — The following was released by the Menhaden Fisheries Coalition:

The Washington Post on September 27 published a story by Mark Robichaux under the headline “Ospreys are disappearing along the East Coast. Scientists think they know why.”

The osprey breeding failures reported in the story are serious and warrant further study. The reporting, however, repeatedly places the commercial menhaden fishery at the center of a causal question that the scientists themselves say remains unresolved, while omitting key details on menhaden management and the fishery’s economic impact.

The article does acknowledge that Dr. Bryan Watts of William & Mary’s Center for Conservation Biology describes the evidence as an association rather than proof that commercial menhaden harvest caused osprey nesting failures. That critical limitation should have guided the rest of the account.

 

The headline blurs what scientists know and what remains uncertain
 

Researchers have identified food stress as the immediate cause of many Chesapeake Bay osprey nesting failures. They have also associated that food stress with reduced delivery of menhaden to some nests. But the Center for Conservation Biology says the underlying causes of reduced menhaden availability are not clear. It lists commercial harvest as one possible factor, alongside climate change, changing distribution and delayed entry of forage species into the Bay. The headline attempts to draw in readers on a false premise.

The distinction is even more important beyond the Chesapeake. In its 2026 compilation of monitoring from 65 study areas, the center says the underlying cause of low reproductive performance at other Atlantic Coast sites is less clear. It says, “we should view ospreys as sentinels for the marine ecosystem rather than a species imperiled.” It also states, “ospreys appear to be secure throughout much of their range but are struggling within some coastal sites.” The Post’s coastwide headline is broader than those findings.

 

The article treats an unmeasured Bay-wide condition as a premise
 

The story states, without attribution, that menhaden are not present when birds and fishermen need them. Researchers have documented reduced menhaden deliveries at some osprey nests, and fishermen describe difficulty finding dependable concentrations in some locations, while abundant concentrations are observed elsewhere and mass fish kills involving mostly juvenile menhadenhave occurred in North Carolina. Those contrasting observations do not measure adult menhaden abundance throughout the Chesapeake Bay or establish a uniform coastwide shortage.

The article also calls menhaden the principal prey of Chesapeake ospreys. Menhaden are an important prey species, particularly in saltier parts of the Bay, but the peer-reviewed study cited in the story says osprey diet composition shifts with salinity: pairs in higher-salinity waters appear to rely on menhaden, while pairs in low-salinity waters depend primarily on catfish and gizzard shad. A USGS study of osprey diets across Chesapeake Bay sites and a USGS presentation to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) summarizing the site-specific results provide the underlying geographic detail. Catfish and gizzard shad accounted for 77 percent and 20 percent of the diet reported for the Susquehanna, respectively, and 52 percent and 28 percent in upper-Bay estuarine areas. At Poplar Island, striped bass accounted for 48 percent and menhaden 44 percent; in lower-Bay estuarine areas, spotted seatrout accounted for 29 percent and menhaden 24 percent. Those data do not support a single Bay-wide description of menhaden as the principal prey.

The 2026 peer-reviewed osprey study says there is no fishery-independent monitoring of adult menhaden in the Bay. According to the authors, that information gap prevents a direct assessment of the relationship between local menhaden abundance and osprey reproduction. They also say the effect of harvest on adult menhaden abundance in the Bay remains unresolved.

 

The Louisiana passage leaves out regulatory and scientific context
 

The article also turns to Louisiana’s separate Gulf menhaden fishery. It reports the 2023 net failures and later enforcement improvements, but omits existing rules governing coastal buffers, release reporting, gear retrieval, vessel tracking and penalties. Following those incidents, the fishery also moved toward stronger purse seine nets and standardized improved bycatch excluder devicesintended to keep larger fish out of the pumping system.

Robichaux also omits the Louisiana wildlife agency’s summary of a state-commissioned, season-long study of the 2024 fishery, which estimated total bycatch at approximately 3.6 percent of catch by weight. In its 2015-2024 comparison, the agency reported that dead menhaden fishery bycatch accounted for 9.9 percent of red drum removals by weight and 2.7 percent of spotted seatrout removals; directed recreational anglers accounted for the remainder, 90.1% and 97.3%, respectively. The aggregate rate does not resolve every species-specific concern, but the results are material context for evaluating the fishery.

 

Claims from advocates and fishermen are observations and policy positions
 

Robichaux quotes Virginia Saltwater Sportfishing Association chairman Steve Atkinson asserting that the Bay no longer contains enough menhaden to support the current reduction fishery and a healthy ecosystem. While there is little doubt that Atkinson made that statement, the scientific record cited in the story does not establish it, and it is presented without challenge.

The ASMFC’s Chesapeake work group expressly did not determine whether the supply of menhaden is sufficient to meet predator demand in the Bay. Nor has the commission determined that a 50 percent reduction in the Bay cap—the policy Atkinson supports—would improve osprey reproduction. The range from no reduction through 50 percent consists of management options under consideration, not measured biological remedies. At no point has the ASMFC provided any scientific rationale for a reduction in the Bay harvest.

Anecdotal accounts like charter captain Chris Newsome’s about difficult fishing deserve to be heard, but Robichaux takes that one named Chesapeake captain’s experience and turns it into an unsubstantiated coastwide conclusion. The story cites no coastwide survey, abundance index, standardized fishing data, additional named fishermen or geographic examples to support its assertion that anglers and fishermen throughout the Atlantic Coast are seeing the same pattern. An unspecified collection of anecdotes is not evidence of a coastwide biological trend. By presenting it that way, Robichaux seeks to create the appearance of broad corroboration while giving readers no way to assess how many people were consulted, where they fish or whether their experiences are representative.

 

The article omits important evidence of sustainable management
 

Robichaux reports that the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission finds Atlantic menhaden not overfished, with overfishing not occurring, but he does not tell readers that the ASMFC already uses ecological reference points designed to account for menhaden’s role as prey or that it reduced the coastwide catch limit by 20 percent for 2026. It also omits that the U.S. Atlantic menhaden purse seine fishery is certified by the Marine Stewardship Council, following independent assessment against the MSC Fisheries Standard.

 

The economic figures are not comparable measures
 

The article compares an estimated $804 million spent on Atlantic recreational fishing trips involving menhaden with roughly $300 million in reported annual sales from Omega Protein’s combined Atlantic and Gulf operations and approximately 260 direct Virginia jobs reported by the companies in the Atlantic menhaden fishery. But it does not explain that the ASMFC’s 2026 Committee on Economics and Social Sciences review expressly describes historical modeling showing that direct harvesting and processing jobs sustain additional non-fishing employment in mechanics, logistics and local services including fuel and lubricants, repairs and maintenance, shipping, vehicle operations, supplies and food, utilities and telephone service, insurance and security, real estate rent, county property taxes and healthcare benefits.

But when it came to the recreational fishing contribution, the story cited a Southwick Associates study commissioned by the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership that casts a very wide net in its economic assumptions, counting all tangential spending on entire fishing trips on which an angler used menhaden as bait, chum or scent. This means they counted anything including transportation, fuel, food, hotels and other purchases as an economic contribution of recreational fishing.

In short, the story’s comparison of the industries’ economics is apples and oranges.

Robichaux mentions the direct Virginia jobs but says nothing about the workers who hold them. UFCW Local 400 says Ocean Harvesters’ crews are overwhelmingly local and unionized and that the operation employs one of the largest minority workforces in Northumberland County. The union has documented collectively bargained increases in base pay, incentive rates and bonuses, as well as health-and-welfare benefits. These are family-supporting union jobs that provide strong wages and full benefits to workers, including many without college degrees—opportunities that no other employer in the Northern Neck provides on a comparable basis. The bigger issue remains that the article never illustrates how a reduction in the Bay Cap would benefit recreational anglers, but reductions would almost certainly result in economic harm to menhaden fishermen and their families. 

The ASMFC’s Committee on Economics and Social Sciences identifies the reduction industry as an important part of the Reedville-area economy. It also warns that high fixed costs mean a small reduction in fishing quota could cause larger unemployment effects. That analysis is relevant to any discussion of workers and communities affected by additional restrictions.

The ASMFC’s economic advisers warn that job losses in the reduction sector could be lasting because comparable work may be hard to find locally.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference raised that concern directly with Maryland Gov. Wes Moore. SCLC urged Maryland to consider how additional restrictions could disproportionately affect African American workers, union families and rural communities, and to weigh environmental stewardship together with economic justice and the consequences for workers and their families. Robichaux does not mention the union workforce or the civil rights organization’s intervention.

 

The February 18 letter does not show opposition to research
 

Robichaux introduces a February 18, 2025 letter from an industry government relations professional to Virginia Del. Betsy Carr and then immediately quotes Chesapeake Bay Foundation executive Chris Moore alleging that the industry is using scientific uncertainty to stall restrictions. CBF has repeatedly used this letter out of context to allege that the industry opposed research funding.

The companies explained to Robichaux that by February 18, the General Assembly was no longer considering the roughly $2 million needed for the full study; discussion had shifted to whether a reduced amount of funding could support useful interim work. The letter responded by proposing a two-year pilot to test aerial and hydroacoustic survey methods that had not yet been validated for estimating Chesapeake Bay menhaden abundance. It also called for a plan and budget for a peer reviewed research program and, as an alternative, recommended returning to the General Assembly in 2026. Read in full and in context, it proposed research under constrained funding and raised concerns about methodology.

What followed after February 2025 undercuts CBF’s characterization. When the 2025 Virginia session ended without funding the proposed comprehensive study, industry participants helped fund a Science Center for Marine Fisheries research roadmap involving VIMS, the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science and NOAA; supported a tagging feasibility study; and opened commercial vessels and processing operations to researchers. That record is inconsistent with Moore’s false claim about the industry’s motive.

The research effort gained substantial public funding in 2026: Virginia committed $2 million over two years, and Congress appropriated $2.5 million for Bay-specific research.

Commercial menhaden fishermen and processing workers support coastal communities and supply fishmeal, fish oil, nutritional products and bait to recreational and commercial fishermen from Maine to Louisiana. They deserve coverage that distinguishes observed osprey food stress from an unproven allegation of fishery causation, and that compares harvest and economic figures on an accurate basis.

 

Sources and documents cited

1. The Washington Post article addressed in this release, September 27, 2026.

2. William & Mary Center for Conservation Biology, 2026 Chesapeake Bay osprey breeding results and Atlantic Coast monitoring summary.

3. Peer-reviewed 2026 osprey study.

4. U.S. Geological Survey, Chesapeake Bay osprey diet study; USGS presentation to ASMFC, August 2024.

5. ASMFC, Chesapeake Bay Menhaden Work Group report, April 2025; Atlantic menhaden FAQs; and 2026 catch-limit announcement.

6. Marine Stewardship Council, U.S. Atlantic menhaden purse-seine fishery listing.

7. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2026 commercial fishing regulations and summary of the 2024 menhaden bycatch study.

8. ASMFC Committee on Economics and Social Sciences, updated employment and economic review, July 2026.

9. Southwick Associates, Atlantic menhaden recreational-fishing economic report, June 2026.

10. UFCW Local 400, menhaden workforce account and collective-bargaining announcement.

11. Southern Christian Leadership Conference letter to Maryland Gov. Wes Moore.

12. February 18, 2025 letter to Virginia Del. Betsy Carr and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation’s statement discussing the research dispute.

13. Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Atlantic menhaden research and funding overview.

About the Menhaden Fisheries Coalition

The Menhaden Fisheries Coalition (MFC) is a collective of menhaden fishermen, related businesses, and supporting industries. Comprised of businesses along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the Menhaden Fisheries Coalition conducts media and public outreach on behalf of the menhaden industry to ensure that members of the public, media, and government are informed of important issues, events, and facts about the fishery.

The Fisherman’s Jim Hutchinson Misrepresents Key Evidence and Attacks Respected New Jersey Scientist’s Objectivity

September 29, 2026 — In The Fisherman’s September 24, 2026 NJ/DE Bay Region Fishing Forecast, New Jersey/Delaware Bay Edition Editor Jim Hutchinson, Jr. pressed for deeper Chesapeake Bay menhaden restrictions while repeating a broader narrative about the fishery that leaves out or conflicts with key parts of the scientific and management record. His report encourages viewers to see the reduction fishery as the cause of Maryland’s bait fishery problems and as a central answer to striped bass concerns, while giving little weight to the current menhaden stock assessment, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s (ASMFC) ecological reference points, the history of the Bay Cap, the Commission’s own scientific uncertainty, or analyses that challenge the so-called “gauntlet” theory.

He questioned fisheries scientist Peter Himchak’s objectivity without noting that his own publication had honored Himchak in 1987 with The Fisherman magazine’s Sportsman of the Year award for his work on striped bass restoration and conservation.

The video was published on YouTube and promoted on Facebook, in addition to appearing on TheFisherman.com as part of the magazine’s September 24 report.

We spoke directly with Himchak for his response. He rejected the suggestion that leaving New Jersey’s Division of Fish and Wildlife for industry work changed his scientific standards.

Read the full release at Access Newswire 

VIRGINIA: Young fishing voice joins Chesapeake Bay menhaden debate

September 24, 2026 — Hundreds of Northern Neck residents turned out Saturday as Virginia’s commercial menhaden community urged fisheries managers to hold off on further Chesapeake Bay harvest restrictions while several new studies of the fishery are underway.

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) is considering changes to the Chesapeake Bay reduction fishery cap through Draft Addendum II to the Atlantic Menhaden Fishery Management Plan. Options include cutting the current 51,000-metric-ton cap by as much as 50 percent and potentially tying it to the coastwide total allowable catch.

According to WHRO Public Media and Rappahannock Record, 439 people attended the Sept. 19 public hearing at Northumberland High School, where many speakers called on managers to wait for additional scientific research before reducing the cap.

The turnout included employees and families connected to Ocean Harvesters and Omega Protein’s Reedville processing operation, as well as other members of the Northern Neck community.

Among those addressing fisheries managers was 13-year-old Charlotte Blackwell, whose father is a fishing boat captain.

Read the full article at National Fisherman