Dr. Brian Rothschild, Dean Emeritus of the University of Massachusetts School for Marine Science and Technology, spoke at the Standard Times Fishing Forum in New Bedford, Massachusetts on November 9, 2010.
THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS BROKEN!
Groundfish management in New England changed radically on May 1, 2010. At that time the days-at-sea system was replaced by the catch-share system. Days-at-sea management resulted in a relatively small number of days fishing per boat, gross underfishing as well as overfishing, and exceeding some quotas. This was not satisfactory, so alternative management structures were proposed. As discussion progressed, NOAA directed the New England Fishery Management Council to implement catch-share management.
The catch-share system has been in operation for six months. Unfortunately, it does not appear to be an improvement over the unsatisfactory days-at-sea system. Success has been measured by proponents in terms of revenues which are slightly greater than last year. However, this is an incomplete index. Revenues do not take into account substantial added costs of the catch-share system that include, among other things, the uncertainty of lease costs, sector management and administration, and the cost of additional equipment. Ignored, as well, are social costs induced by laying off crew when quota is exchanged.
There is no available analysis by NOAA on the performance of the new system, but it does appear that the catch-share system has generated an economic crisis. The economic crisis was spelled out in a recent letter from Governor Patrick to the secretary of commerce. The governor’s letter pointed out that, of the 385 boats that have joined sectors, nearly 60% have not fished this year. Two-thirds of the fishing permits were allocated only 50-60% of their 2007-2009 harvest. Ten percent of Massachusetts sector boats landed 65% of the total revenue, while 90% of the boats landed 35% of the total revenue.
Projecting this trajectory to the end of the fishing year places the crisis in bold relief as we translate these dry statistics into lost livelihoods and collapses of small businesses.
One of the most striking features of the comparison between the days-at-sea system and the catch-share system is the failure of the catch-share system to eliminate gross underfishing. Under the days-at-sea system, only 30% of the total allowable catch (TAC) was landed. This wasted $280 million each year. Under the catch-share system we project that the fishery will continue to catch only 30% of the TAC. (The absolute waste will be less because the TACs are much lower.)
LACK OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS AND PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION
It is striking that this major federal action was put into place prematurely without the level of analysis, planning, budgeting, and community dialogue that would be expected with a major federal action. It turns out that reasonable alternatives were not considered. A greater surprise is that the economic and social performance of the catch-share experiment is not being tracked by NOAA. It appears that NOAA has committed itself to the belief, put forth by conservation organizations, that catch shares are the magical cure to all ills, real or imagined.
FLAUNTING THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
If one reads the plain language of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, one is immediately struck by the extent the catch-share system departs from the intent of congress.
First, the Magnuson-Stevens Act states no … “[conservation and management measure] shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose” (Sec. 301(a)(5)). Yet it is difficult to consider the catch-share system as having any function other than economic allocation as its sole purpose. Second, the Magnuson- Stevens Act states that no individual fishing quota shall be instituted in New England without a referendum. Yet NOAA evidently used catch-share semantics to avoid a referendum. Third, the congress made the analysis of alternatives a center piece in the National Environmental Policy Act. Yet the implementation of Amendment 16 was not based on a portfolio of meaningful alternatives. Fourth, National Standard 8 directs NOAA to take into account “… the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing economic and social data …” Yet, as is particularly obvious now, this has not been done. And fifth, National Standard 4 affirms fair and equitable allocation. Yet there are several seemingly valid disputes concerning whether initial allocations were fair and equitable.
STRATEGIC STEPS FORWARD
1) We need a level playing field on what is really happening and what is likely to happen. There is too much at stake to rely on partial answers, suppositions, and false scenarios. Where is the hard analysis of what is happening?
2) We need to maximize economic survival of participants during the first year by relaxing ACLs without overfishing.
3) We need to develop a process to compensate those who have been unfairly or illegally harmed by the catch-share system.
4) We need to implement major programs of cooperative research.
5) We need to facilitate and accelerate restructuring of the fishery management process in New England, including data collection, stock assessment, and delivery of information to stakeholders. Special emphasis needs to be placed on flexibility and the mixed-species nature of our fisheries.
6) An independent commission needs to be empanelled to monitor the progress of the restructuring. The commission should report to congress.
Read Dr. Rothschild's complete statement at the Standard-Times Fishing Forum.