A new study uses the concepts of economic anthropology to understand the failures of New England groundfish management and to craft broad recommendations to correct the situation
“Modeling Disaster: The Failure of Management of the New England Groundfish Industry” is one of the latest papers to come from well-known “lobster commons” expert James Acheson, who has studied the success of Maine lobster fishery management for more than 20 years.
Maine’s lobster fishery, the study says, is well managed and sustainable, thanks largely to the role played by the localized nature of the fishery and the conservation ethic that arises when people know each other and solve problems together.
The “prisoner's dilemma” is a fundamental problem in game theory that demonstrates why two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so.
The classic example of the prisoner's dilemma involves two suspects arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated the prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation.
If it is assumed that each suspect cares only about minimizing his own time in jail, then the prisoner’s dilemma forms a game in which two prisoners may each cooperate with the police. The only concern of each individual prisoner is maximizing his own payoff, without concern for the other prisoner’s payoff.
Groundfishermen, the authors write, are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma, from which they have failed to escape.
“Until they do escape, this fishery will continue its downward spiral,” the authors write.
The authors rename the problem “the fishermen’s dilemma.” If conservation of the resource is the heart of fishery management, they write, then fishermen, to put it simplistically, have two choices – to follow the status quo, which represents overexploitation, or to follow a better management scheme. If the industry continues to follow the status quo, they write, there is no long-term payoff because the resource will continue to spiral down. If the industry follows a better management scheme, the payoff will be equal to the benefits of the scheme minus the costs. The full benefit of following a better management scheme is only achieved if everyone in the fishery follows the rule. Otherwise, the benefit is proportional to the number following the rule – that is, the fewer people who follow the rule, the lower the benefit.
Read the complete story at Fishermen's Voice.