Saving Seafood

Catch quota implemented to protect swordfish

November 23, 2016 — A world body of fishing and shipping nations approved a catch quota yesterday to protect the overharvested Mediterranean swordfish, the EU and conservation group Oceana said.

The limit was set at 10,500 tonnes for 2017 at a meeting of the 51-member International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in Vilamoura, Portugal.

It will be reduced by three per cent per year between 2018 and 2022.

“It’s done. Finally, ICCAT on its 50th anniversary moved a step forward on this too long-neglected stock,” Oceana’s Ilaria Vielmini said in the coastal town where the commission held its annual meeting.

Read the full story from AFP at NT News

Environmental Bullies – Conservationists or Agenda-pushers?

March 22, 2016 (Saving Seafood) – Dr. John Sibert, an emeritus professor at the University of Hawaii, has come to the defense of scientists whose research conflicts with the agendas of conservation ideologues. Dr. Sibert specifically targets Carl Safina and others who have painted recent research by Dr. Molly Lutcavage as “controversial.” Dr. Lutcavage’s research, which appeared in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and was featured in NPR, presented evidence that Western Atlantic Bluefin tuna may be more resilient to harvesting than previously thought.

In an article for CFOOD, a University of Washington project chaired by Dr. Ray Hilborn that corrects erroneous stories about fisheries sustainability, Dr. Sibert criticizes environmentalists who resort to personal attacks on researchers whose findings they oppose. Saving Seafood partners with CFOOD to help deliver these facts to the public.

“Instead of attacking the messenger and implying that Lutcavage and her colleagues are industry tools, Safina should have embraced the science, supported tuna conservation, and applied pressure in ICCAT to change its antiquated management. By attempting to smear Lutcavage and her NOAA colleagues, he demeans science in general and those of us who try to apply scientific approaches to resource management in particular,” Dr. Sibert wrote.

Last week, Dr. Lutcavage wrote a piece about her own struggles with environmental bullies.

Dr. Sibert’s full comments are below:

I, like many other scientists, practice my profession with the expectation that my work will be used to improve management policies. However, scientists who choose to work on subjects that intersect with management of natural resources sometimes become targets of special interest pressures. Pressure to change or “spin” research results occurs more often than it should. Pressure arrives in many forms— usually as phone calls from colleagues, superiors, or the media; the pressure seldom arrives in writing.

I have had a long career spanning several fields and institutions and have been pressured to change my views on restriction of industrial activities in intertidal zones in estuaries, on the necessity of international tuna fisheries management agencies, on the limited role of commercial fishing in the deterioration of marine turtle populations, on the lack of accuracy and reliability of electronic fish tags, and on the inefficacy of marine protected areas for tuna conservation.

My most recent experience with pressure came from a stringer who writes for Science magazine. Some colleagues and I had just published a paper that analyzed area-based fishery management policies for conservation of bigeye tuna. Although the paper was very pessimistic about the use of MPAs for tuna fishery management, this particular stringer contacted me about MPAs. We had an exchange of emails in which he repeatedly tried to spin some earlier results on median lifetime displacements of skipjack and yellowfin tuna into an argument supporting creation of MPAs. We then made an appointment to talk “face to face” via Skype. His approach was to play word games with my replies to his questions in order to make it seem that my research supported MPAs. I repeatedly explained to him that our research showed that closing high-seas pockets had no effect whatsoever on the viability of tuna populations and that empirical evidence showed that the closure of the western high seas pockets in 2008 had in fact increased tuna catches. We hung up at that point, and I have no idea what he wrote for Science.

When critics run out of fact, some resort to personal attack. During discussions about turtle conservation in the early 2000s, an attorney for an environmental group told a committee of scientists that we were in effect a bunch of fishing industry apologists with no knowledge of turtles or population dynamics. More recently, my friend and collaborator, Molly Lutcavage was recently subject of a personal attack by Carl Safina after she and her colleagues published an important discovery of a new spawning area for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. This discovery ought to push the International Commission of the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna to abandon its simplistic two stock approach to management of ABFT. (Whether ICCAT will actually change its approach is another question.) Safina made the outrageously false assertion that the authors’ “… main concern is not recovery, not conservation, but how their findings can allow additional exploitation.”   Instead of attacking the messenger and implying that Lutcavage and her colleagues are industry tools, Safina should have embraced the science, supported tuna conservation, and applied pressure in ICCAT to change its antiquated management. By attempting to smear Lutcavage and her NOAA colleagues, he demeans science in general and those of us who try to apply scientific approaches to resource management in particular.

Read the commentary at CFOOD

 

DAVID SCHALIT: Report from ICCAT

December 7, 2015 — The following is a commentary submitted to Saving Seafood by David Schalit, the Vice President of the American Bluefin Tuna Association:

The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) used to be the regional fishery management organization everybody loved to hate.  Its dysfunctionality was legendary.  ICCAT became famous because it is the regional fishery management organization responsible for Atlantic bluefin tuna, the famously “iconic” and “charismatic” tuna stock that has been the subject of intense media interest for a very long time and the only tuna species to star in its own cable television series. 

ICCAT’s Problem

In the mid-late 1990’s, due to concerns expressed by ICCAT scientists about the status of Atlantic bluefin, ICCAT began adopting measures to limit harvest of both east and west stocks.  Only the west Atlantic harvesters heeded the advices of ICCAT scientists.  European Union fishing countries and other eastern harvesters who target east Atlantic bluefin weren’t listening.  During the next several years the east Atlantic stock was subject to consistent and increasing overfishing, illegal fishing and unreported fishing.  In 2007 – the worst year on record for east Atlantic bluefin – ICCAT scientists estimated that catch in the east Atlantic could be as high as 60,000 MT, almost twice the allowed quota.  

As a consequence, “the plight of the Atlantic bluefin” became the subject of ongoing public relations campaigns by numerous environmental organizations.  Annual meetings of ICCAT in the years leading up to 2008 developed a circus atmosphere, consisting of a full complement of delegates, a large number of industry representatives, media and environmental observers as well as environmental activists who regularly demonstrated outside of the meeting venue.  As a result, ICCAT meetings were regularly covered by media worldwide.  

ICCAT’s Redemption

ICCAT finally began to redeem itself during its 2008 meeting when it mustered the political will to cease overfishing and begin the process of rebuilding east Atlantic bluefin stock.  Today, both east and west Atlantic bluefin stocks have become a fishery management success story. 

The New Problem

However, ICCAT may be returning to its old ways.  This time, the problem is with Atlantic bigeye tuna.  ICCAT scientists turned in a stock assessment on Atlantic bigeye this October indicating that the stock is presently overfished and with overfishing presently taking place.  ICCAT scientists urged the adoption of conservation measures to immediately address this problem.  Last week, the 24th annual meeting of ICCAT was held in Malta.  Unfortunately, when the meeting came to a close on November 17, ICCAT had failed to achieve meaningful conservation measures for Atlantic bigeye tuna.  Sound familiar?

What Were the Objectives?

The scientists recommended steps that would lead to increasing “future chances that the stock will be at a level that is consistent with the convention objectives.” The primary means available to ICCAT for achieving this were a reduction in harvesting of mature bigeye in the central/south Atlantic and a reduction in bycatch of juvenile bigeye in the Gulf of Guinea skipjack fishery.  Neither of these goals was met.

Major Harvesting Forces

The Atlantic bigeye tuna fishery consists of 8 major harvesters and 11 minor harvesters.  The eight major harvesters (China, EU, Ghana, Japan, Panama, Philippines, Korea and Chinese Taipei) are, in total, a fleet of 659 longline vessels plus assorted “support vessels”, mostly fishing in the equatorial Atlantic, in deep water, for mature bigeye.  The EU alone has 269 vessels in this fleet, and Japan has 245.  

In addition, there are 51 purse seine vessels permitted by ICCAT to operate in the Gulf of Guinea skipjack fishery that are responsible for significant bycatch of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin.  Of those 51 vessels, the EU (France and Spain) is the largest fleet, with 34 vessels.

To put this in perspective, in 2014, the 8 major harvesters were responsible for over 53,000 MT of bigeye catch, whereas the 11 minor harvesters, including the U.S. and Brazil, were responsible for just under 14,000 MT.  (The U.S. reported 800 MT of catch in 2014.)  And there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the level of mortality on juvenile bigeye in the purse seine fishery. 

The Negotiations

During the negotiations at last week’s meeting, the U.S., Brazil and a few other minor harvesters squared off against the very well prepared forces of the EU and Japan who had the backing of their formidable fishing industries.  It is said that those who have “the most skin in the game” tend to prevail and so, notwithstanding the efforts of the U.S., Brazil and others to reduce fishing effort by these major harvesters, the EU, Japan and the 6 other major harvesters were the winners and Atlantic bigeye tuna was the loser.

Curiously, the major harvesters can make the claim to have reduced the overall TAC.  Atlantic bigeye harvesting is presently governed by an Atlantic-wide TAC from which each of the 8 major harvesters are given a fixed, “not to exceed” individual TAC. Last week, the major harvesters agreed to reduce their combined allowed TAC from its present level of 79,000 MT to to 58,000 MT.  This gives the distinct impression that significant conservation measures were taken.  However, landings averaged over the last 5 years are below 58,000 MT.  In actual fact, this agreement allows these harvesters another 9,000 MT above their reported landings of 2014.  Consequently, no actual cuts in catch were made. 

The Fiasco in the Gulf of Guinea

The problem in the Gulf of Guinea is an issue that has plagued ICCAT since the 1990s. ICCAT has made various attempts, beginning in the late 90’s, to reduce bycatch of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin typically weighing no more than 3-6 lbs, in the Gulf of Guinea purse seine skipjack fishery.  According to the scientists, none of these attempts yielded any reduction in bigeye bycatch.  Why?

At each ICCAT meeting in which this bycatch problem was addressed, the EU has tendered its own fully detailed proposal to address the problem.  In each instance, their proposal involved a variation on the concept of a time/area closure in the Gulf of Guinea for a fixed period during each fishing season.  Since the EU purse seine fleet is the dominant force in the Gulf of Guinea skipjack fishery, it is difficult to imagine why ICCAT would have ever seriously considered an EU proposal.  Clearly, the EU’s interests are best served by thwarting any conservation action that would have a negative effect on its seining activities in the Gulf.  However, in each instance, ICCAT has adopted the EU’s proposal.  And in every instance, ICCAT scientists subsequently found that these closures did not result in the reduction of bycatch.  Today, these facts are well known to ICCAT member countries.  So, why did ICCAT, in last week’s meeting, adopt a new EU-authored solution to the problem of bigeye bycatch that is likely to achieve nothing?  This, too, is reminiscent of the “old” ICCAT.

Final Outcome

We can point to other successes that came out of the ICCAT meeting such as significant progress on Convention amendments, eBCD and the development of harvest control rules; all important issues.  But if ICCAT fails in its primary task – the “conservation of Atlantic tunas” – all other successful initiatives are diminished in importance because of that failure. 

Fortunately for ICCAT, it has a chance to partially redeem itself at next years’ meeting, when it will address Atlantic yellowfin tuna, a stock that has some of the same problems as Atlantic bigeye.  Unfortunately, ICCAT will have to wait until 2018 to have a chance to again address the issue of conservation of bigeye tuna.

Statement by U.S. Commissioner Russell F. Smith III at the Conclusion of the 2015 Annual ICCAT Meeting

December 3, 2015 — The following was released by NOAA Fisheries: 

This year’s International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) meeting was characterized by an unprecedented level of engagement from a broad range of parties that joined together to promote the sustainable management in ICCAT fisheries. This collaboration is critical to the effective work of ICCAT, and we hope that these relationships will continue to be fostered and strengthened in the future.

Negotiations on amendments to the 1969 ICCAT Convention were advanced to a near-final stage. The amended Convention will reflect modern principles, such as the precautionary and ecosystem approaches to fisheries management, clarify the Commission’s management authority, particularly for sharks, and improve the governance of the Commission.

In keeping with another major U.S. priority, the electronic system for tracking bluefin tuna catch and trade is near completion and is anticipated to be ready for full implementation in the spring of 2016. This should help address and prevent illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and help improve management of the stock by providing ready access to data about catch and trade.

Agreement was reached on the development of harvest control rules and management strategy evaluation as important tools to support future decision-making. This measure details the process by which alternative biological reference points (i.e., threshold and limit biomass levels, and the target fishing mortality rate) will be identified and tested by the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS). North Atlantic albacore will be the first stock; a management objective has been defined and the development of harvest control rules will continue in 2016. The Commission will provide specific input in three areas for individual stocks: (1) management objectives; (2) acceptable levels of probability (e.g., of achieving targets or avoiding limits); and (3) timeframes for ending overfishing and/or rebuilding.

We are disappointed that the Commission did not do more to address overfishing of bigeye tuna despite the clear advice from the SCRS, which called for a reduction in the total allowable catch (TAC) and in the fishing mortality on the smallest juvenile bigeye tuna that are caught in the Gulf of Guinea. Tropical tunas support important U.S. commercial and recreational fisheries. With this in mind, we sought a more comprehensive approach to rebuild the stock with greater certainty, including a lower TAC as well as a longer and larger time/area closure to protect juveniles. Although these positions were rejected by the major players in the fishery, we will continue to manage bigeye tuna responsibly within the United States.

Atlantic-wide TAC levels for overfished stocks of blue marlin and white marlin will remain in effect until new scientific advice is available in 2018. We had hoped to include provisions to require the use of circle hooks to minimize post-release mortality, and related scientific research, but these efforts were rejected.

With respect to sharks, a new measure requires the release of porbeagle sharks encountered alive in ICCAT fisheries and, if catches of porbeagle increase beyond 2014 levels in the future, additional actions will be considered. The United States again proposed to prohibit shark finning at sea and to require sharks that are landed to have fins naturally attached. The number of co-sponsors for this proposal increased substantially, from 12 in 2014 to 30 in 2015, now more than a majority of all ICCAT parties. Despite this groundswell of support, a few parties declared their staunch opposition to this measure, and it was not adopted.

ICCAT invested a significant amount of time and effort to review the compliance of its 50 Contracting Parties with existing obligations, evaluating various reporting requirements as well as conservation and management measures. There was demonstrated improvement in ICCAT parties’ reporting of catch data and other information this year, but there is further work to do to ensure that all parties are in full compliance with all reporting obligations. The United States will continue to push ICCAT and its parties to be forward leaning and to prioritize the implementation of a robust and transparent compliance process.

Read the statement from NOAA online